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Abstract 
Ten women who work in ABC television news studios and offices in Toowong Brisbane Australia, have 
developed invasive breast cancer within a relatively short period of time, one of the first diagnoses being 
in 2002 (Swan 2007). The unhappy coincidence of ten women in the same workplace developing breast 
cancer is disturbingly insidious. Initial investigations were not able to identify a cause or explanation. A 
subsequent, very thorough inquiry led by Professor Bruce Armstrong has not been able to identify the 
specific cause of the breast cancer either, but it has found that the Brisbane ABC studios present an 
unequivocal risk to health. The incidence of breast cancer in women working at the studios was not 
considered random or coincidental, it was found to be ten times the expected rate (Armstrong 2006). The 
studios have now been abandoned, and all ten cases of breast cancer have been designated a rare 
‘cancer cluster’ (Swan 2007). 
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Toxic Tort and the Articulation 
of Environmental Risk
Jo Goodie
Introduction — Our risk anxiety made real
Ten women who work in ABC television news studios and offices in 
Toowong Brisbane Australia, have developed invasive breast cancer 
within a relatively short period of time, one of the first diagnoses being 
in 2002 (Swan 2007). The unhappy coincidence of ten women in the 
same workplace developing breast cancer is disturbingly insidious. 
Initial investigations were not able to identify a cause or explanation. A 
subsequent, very thorough inquiry led by Professor Bruce Armstrong 
has not been able to identify the specific cause of the breast cancer 
either, but it has found that the Brisbane ABC studios present an 
unequivocal risk to health. The incidence of breast cancer in women 
working at the studios was not considered random or coincidental, it 
was found to be ten times the expected rate (Armstrong 2006). The 
studios have now been abandoned, and all ten cases of breast cancer 
have been designated a rare ‘cancer cluster’ (Swan 2007).
Esperance is a reasonably sized but remote town on the southern 
coast of Western Australia. It is a place noted for its stunning beaches 
which appear impossibly pristine, but parts of the town have been 
poisoned by lead carbonate. Up to a thousand native birds have died; 
rainwater tanks, backyard veggie patches and chook runs have become 
potentially toxic (The West Australian May 5 2007: 8). Six children 
have been found to have lead blood levels above recommended health 
guidelines (The West Australian May 5 2007: 8). All of this has happened 
in a place which, because of its isolation, we would assume to be 
outside any zone of toxic risk. However in Esperance, unlike the ABC 
Brisbane studios, the source of the toxin is readily identifiable — it 
comes from the town’s port where powdered lead carbonate has been 
loaded on ships for export.
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Both the ABC and the Esperance cases have been newsworthy 
because they tap a common anxiety — that the environment in which 
we live and work may harbour unknown toxins, or that the technology 
which we use every day may be doing us some sort of harm. In an 
interview with Dr Norman Swan on the ABC ‘Health Report’, Nadia 
Farha, one of the ABC journalists in Brisbane who developed breast 
cancer, articulated this anxiety. Upon learning of the findings of the 
Armstrong Inquiry she said:
I was really upset, I think that’s where it actually hit me that maybe 
working for the ABC at that particular site I could have got my breast 
cancer. And you think that you’d worked for an organisation all of these 
years, and you’ve given them the best of your career to find that working 
there may eventually kill you brought me down to earth pretty much in 
a hurry. I was really shocked, and I think some of the women weren’t that 
shocked because I think that’s what they expected but I hadn’t expected 
that (Swan 2007).
The fear, anger and frustration felt by Nadia Farha and others 
involved in such cases of toxic exposure are easily understood. Douglas 
and Wildalsky have observed that in practice the environment is a 
pivotal focus of risk anxiety — people are afraid of ‘nothing much … 
except the food they eat, the water they drink, the air they breathe, the 
land they live on, and the energy they use’ (1982: 10). It is not difficult 
to empathise with the strong need of the people involved in these cases 
to identify the source of their toxic exposure and to hold somebody 
accountable. Especially because, while each of these cases may be 
shocking, the circumstances by which the women in the ABC studios 
or the people who live in Esperance came to be exposed to something 
toxic are not so exceptional. These people were simply living their lives 
in a manner not so very different to any other person who works in a 
news studio or lives in a country town by the sea. It could have been 
one of us who developed cancer because our workplace was a toxic 
site, or because our rainwater became undrinkable. It might have been 
the beachside town we went to regularly for summer holidays that 
became polluted by a toxin as dangerous as lead carbonate.
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The possibility of suing in toxic tort
Taking some sort of legal action, holding somebody accountable and 
legally liable, would not be an unusual response to what has happened 
in Esperance or for the women who have developed cancer while 
working in the ABC Brisbane studio. Suing in ‘toxic tort’ (negligence) 
became one of many forms of legal response to the unanticipated 
hazards of twentieth-century technology and consumption. It has 
been popularised by Hollywood and made practically possible by 
innovative legal practitioners such as the plaintiffs’ law firm Slater and 
Gordon, which has made its reputation in a number of high profile 
‘toxic tort’ cases (Cannon 1998). Toxic tort has become a notorious 
field of litigation largely due to the super-sized damages awarded in 
mass toxic tort claims in the United States, but also because of claims 
that the development of toxic tort doctrine has allowed individuals to 
rationalise their misfortune through tenuous connections to improbable 
causes (Huber 1991). It is nonetheless exemplary of Sheila Jasanoff ’s 
observation that ‘courts are often the first social institutions to give 
public voice and meaning to inaudible struggles between human 
communities and their technological creations’ (1995: 12). Actions 
in toxic tort endorse and articulate risk anxiety, particularly in those 
instances where the litigation gives publicity to latent hazards that had 
previously been little known in the public domain (Rabin 1993: 126). 
As Ulrich Beck observes:
Dangers, it would seem, do not exist ‘in themselves’, independently of our 
perceptions. They become a political issue only when people are generally 
aware of them; they are social constructs which are strategically defined, 
covered up or dramatized in the public sphere with the help of scientific 
material supplied for the purpose (1999: 22).
The judicial adjudication of the defendant’s duty of care in the 
context of the foreseeability of the risk to which the plaintiff was 
exposed, as well as the amassing of evidence of causation, makes toxic 
tort litigation the occasion for anxiety about the risks of certain toxins 
to be quite publicly acknowledged and delineated. The litigation plays 
a not insubstantial role in setting normative standards for our tolerance 
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of toxic risk (Havemann 2003: 38, Rabin 2001: 352–3). Toxic tort 
litigation also provides a certain type of vehicle for articulating the 
relationship between our body, hazards and the environment (Kroll-
Smith & Westervelt 2004, Lee 2000, Rabin 2001).
No one is suing yet, but media reports of what has happened 
in Esperance and in the ABC studios have focused on issues and 
responses to events which might well presage some of the individuals 
affected taking some form of legal action. Various news reports and 
documentaries have focused on factors such as the need of people 
exposed to dangerous toxins to be heard; their desire to have the 
matter properly investigated; their continued anxiety about the toxicity 
of their immediate living and working environment; their anger at 
becoming the particular victims of a toxic hazard; and their ongoing 
concern that there appears to be a continuing toxic risk that might 
impact on other people (ABC News Online 27 March 2007, 12 June 
2007, Swan 2007, The West Australian 5 May 2007). While these sorts 
of concerns are far less tangible than any physical injury the women 
who worked at the ABC Brisbane studio or the people of Esperance 
may have suffered, they are nevertheless central to their subjective 
appreciation of the risk presented by the toxic exposure.
So could either the ABC women or any of the individuals exposed 
to lead in Esperance litigate successfully? The source of the toxicity 
in the ABC case is elusive, while in Esperance it is pretty clear-cut. It 
is therefore unlikely at this stage that it will be possible for the ABC 
women to sue, because establishing causation and responsibility for 
the exposure appears to be beyond science and in turn the law. But the 
circumstances by which some people in Esperance came to unwittingly 
make themselves vulnerable to lead poisoning by growing their own 
veggies and collecting rain water in tanks may yet be played out in 
the courts. Slater and Gordon have been to Esperance and undertaken 
investigations into the circumstance of the toxic exposure, but the only 
publicly reported action the firm has taken is a letter of demand to the 
Minister responsible to establish a compensation scheme which would 
allow those affected to avoid litigation (The West Australian 5 May 2007: 
73
Toxic Tort
8). Because of their reputation Slater and Gordon’s letter may well have 
some persuasive force. But they would know from experience that toxic 
tort litigation is an inefficient and often compromised endeavour, both 
because the hazards of post-industrial society are difficult to identify 
and because the causal nexus between injury/damage and hazard is 
difficult to trace (Cannon 1998, Lee 2000).
The success of toxic tort litigation depends on being able to identify 
by expert scientific evidence both the nature of the toxin and the causal 
link between the plaintiff ’s exposure to the toxin and the injuries 
they have suffered. John Fleming acknowledges that ‘[a]n abiding 
difficulty of toxic torts is to attribute responsibility to the defendant 
amidst other possible causes, such as other pollutants, unrelated diseases 
or carcinogens like smoking etc’ (1997: 71). Tort principles of the 
nineteenth century were premised on the assumption that there is 
usually a single line of causation linking the defendant’s negligence to 
the plaintiff ’s injury. However, science and medicine have developed 
to the point where an injury may be attributed to a range of possible 
causes. The medical model that is employed to determine the actual 
cause of the injuries is not based on direct causality. It is based on a 
‘multi-factor approach’ which understands ‘the problem of health in 
a broader context’ whereby disease can be attributed to exposure to a 
variety of toxins as well as the lifestyle and patterns of consumption of 
plaintiffs themselves (Lanthier & Olivier 1999: 75).  As demonstrated 
by the ABC case, scientists cannot always identify a toxin even when 
the effects of exposure to it are evident. Scientists also know very little 
about the actual effects of many known or suspected toxins, despite 
the fact that the effects of exposure to some toxins such as lead are 
well documented (Cranor & Eastmond 2001: 11). Even when a causal 
link is established the court may determine that at the time of the 
exposure the state of knowledge of the particular toxic hazard was so 
limited that the harm the plaintiff has suffered was not ‘foreseeable’. 
In such a case the defendant would not be expected to know of the 
risk or be considered able, in a technical sense, to limit the plaintiff ’s 
exposure. (The ABC case is likely to be in this category.) If so, the 
defendant will not be found to have breached the duty of care that 
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she or he owed to the plaintiff and will not be legally liable (Wyong 
Shire Council v Shirt).
And so we come to the issue that is the focus of this paper. If the 
toxic exposure at the ABC Brisbane studios or in Esperance were to 
become the subject of toxic tort action, and we could think past the 
obstacles to litigation in these two cases, what would be the relevance 
to any such litigation of the anxiety and concerns of the potential 
plaintiffs? How, if at all, would their quite subjective and particular 
appreciation of the toxic hazard to which they have been exposed be 
assessed? Does what Beck (1992) or Douglas and Wildalsky (1982) 
would label the plaintiffs’ ‘risk anxiety’ have any legitimate role in 
the determination of a toxic tort claim? I suggest that although toxic 
tort litigation clearly does not offer the same forum as a television 
documentary or a news report for exploring these matters, it is not 
utterly divorced from their significance. As former Australian High 
Court Justice Michael McHugh has observed, the application of tort 
doctrine ‘depend[s] not only upon the ascertainment of facts but on 
a moral and social evaluation of those facts’ (1989: 13).
Discussion of toxic tort cases often focuses on the inevitable disputes 
over the veracity of scientific evidence (see for example Cranor & 
Eastmond 2001, Edmond & Mercer 2002, 2004, Huber 1991). In 
this piece I consider the interaction of scientific evidence with other 
more commonplace evidence of the non-expert plaintiff and others 
who actually experienced the toxic exposure (as have Jasanoff 1995, 
Morrow 2000, Rabin 1993, 2001, Toffolon-Weiss & Timmons Roberts 
2004). My object is not so much to determine the degree to which 
toxic tort litigation gives public voice and meaning to a plaintiff ’s 
particular experience of toxic exposure, although their ‘day in court’ 
is obviously in some sense an attempt by the plaintiff to give ‘voice’ 
to their subjective appreciation and particular experience of the toxic 
exposure. My analysis is less ambitious; it considers the dynamic 
interaction of the scientific and lay evidence in toxic tort litigation. 
In doing so I take up the concept of ‘risk’ as a device for examining 
and comparing the various ways by which toxic tort litigation engages 
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with and analyses a case of toxic exposure that is alleged to have caused 
an injury or loss.
Analysing toxic tort litigation 
through the figure of risk
In her theorisation of the interrelationship between law and risk Jenny 
Steele has observed that risk calculation, vocabulary and techniques 
are taken up in litigation in specialised ways to facilitate appropriate 
judgments regarding risk-taking limits and responsibilities, although 
in other domains they can serve quite a different purpose (2004: 9). 
‘Risk’ has many meanings and functions. It is a quantitative, actuarial 
calculation which measures the probability of an event occurring 
and, as such, is a commodity that can be traded. Risk is also a socially 
constructed notion which shapes decision and policy-making (Dean 
1999). The concept of risk is readily employed in everyday discourse 
and mediates the relationships people have to certain activities (Lupton 
1999). It is a label which is attached to hazard, danger and uncertainty 
in both a scientific and in an everyday sense (Ewald 1991). Risk is 
also culturally constructed as the focus of a certain type of anxiety 
(Douglas 1992). None of these understandings of risk is isolated from 
other knowledges of risk; indeed, differing conceptions of risk are 
often conflated in particular contexts, like the courtroom, to create 
wholly unique means of understanding risk suited to a particular task, 
such as assigning legal liability (Valverde, Levi & Moore 2005: 86). In 
terms of this discussion ‘risk’, simply put, is a way of conceptualising, 
measuring and talking about environmental hazards. Rather than 
being a label which attaches to certain hazards, ‘risk’ here is a product 
of certain forms of thinking and calculation.
The shift from thinking about risk in non-legal terms to assessing its 
role in the litigation process is not a straightforward manoeuvre. Steele 
observes that the courts necessarily engage in a quite specialised legal 
sense with the vocabulary and techniques of risk in their adjudication 
of disputes involving the appropriate limits and responsibilities of 
risk-taking (2004: 9). Risk is conceptualised and employed by the 
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law in a variety of ways. Pat O’Malley’s (2004) depiction of the three 
manifestations of risk in the legal domain is applicable to toxic tort 
litigation. O’Malley contends that risk is the object of various forms 
of legal intervention, the purpose of which is to assign responsibility 
for the management of risk-taking. Risks are assigned moral value — 
the law either privileges or seeks to limit various forms of risk — and 
techniques of risk assessment are employed to determine the limits of 
legal liability.
The assessment of risk in the toxic tort claim
Possible exposure to the risk of harm is not enough to found a tort 
claim. The plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that they have actually 
suffered an injury attributable to the defendant’s negligence. Even 
though toxic tort may become an occasion for the litigious expression 
of popular risk anxiety, the traditions of common law litigation require 
the parties to support their case with expert testimony as to the actual, 
rather than simply apprehended, nature of the risk to which the plaintiff 
was exposed. Scientific calculations and assessments of the harm the 
plaintiff suffered and the actual risk they were exposed to are central 
to the resolution of any toxic tort claim. The plaintiff must not only 
provide medical evidence of his or her actual injury — that will not 
be sufficient to determine the claim. Whether the defendant should 
be held responsible for the plaintiff ’s injury will depend in large part 
upon the risk calculations of the epidemiologist and the environmental 
engineer. The court’s application of various technical or scientific risk 
technologies allows an ‘objective’ assessment of both the foreseeability 
of the plaintiff suffering an injury as well as the causal nexus between 
the injury and the toxic exposure or environment.
However, the success of a plaintiff ’s or defendant’s case is not 
wholly determined by scientific and technical expert evidence; it 
will also be determined by evidence of other, non-scientific and quite 
subjective, calculations of risk. There are four interrelated conceptions 
of risk which I take up in the following discussion of the interaction 
of scientific and lay evidence in most toxic tort cases. They are: the 
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insurantial, the scientific, the everyday or common sense, and the 
clinical. The function of insurance has facilitated the emergence of 
toxic tort as a specific form of negligence action (Fleming 1992). 
The scientific assessment of risk by the epidemiologist has become 
increasingly important in toxic tort cases in marking the boundary 
between tenable and tenuous claims in toxic tort (Edmonds & 
Mercer 2002, Jasanoff, 1995: 16). The role of everyday or common 
sense notions of risk is not so evident in toxic tort litigation. Unlike 
epidemiological calculations of risk it has not been the focus of 
academic debate. Nevertheless the particulars of the plaintiff ’s 
claim are scrutinised through the lens of everyday or common sense 
conceptualisations of the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s conduct (Valverde, 
Levi & Moore 2005: 86, Seltsam v McGuiness). I suggest here that 
one way of conceptualising how the individual plaintiff ’s particular 
experience of toxic exposure interfaces with broader population-based 
assessments of risk produced by the epidemiologist or environmental 
engineer is to think of the actual litigation as applying a ‘clinical risk’ 
approach. Unlike epidemiological assessments of risk, which identify 
risks factors across populations, the clinical risk approach conceptualises 
the risk in terms of its impact on specific individuals. ‘That is, the 
individual is treated not simply as representative of a risk category but 
as a unique case to which certain risk factors apply’ (O’Malley 2004: 
25). In toxic tort litigation the court to some extent adopts a clinical 
gaze or perspective. The court’s assessment of the plaintiff ’s case not 
only involves situating the incidence of her or his toxic exposure in 
the context of accepted knowledge about the risk associated with 
exposure to the toxin. It is also the court’s appreciation of the parties’ 
personal and quite specific experience and exposure to risk, and their 
behaviour in the face of such exposure, which in large part determines 
the outcome of the proceedings.
Insurantial risk
Actions in tort take place against and within the operation of various 
state regulated and private schemes of insurance. Commentators on 
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the development of tort law have identified a number of key effects 
insurance and insurability have upon the tort system in general and the 
conduct of tort litigation in particular. Perhaps the most profound effect 
is identified by Fleming, who argues that without liability insurance 
‘the tort system would have long ago collapsed under the weight of 
the demands placed upon it’ (1992: 11). As liability insurance became 
relatively common the historical conservatism that militated against 
the emergence of new forms of action was displaced. Jane Stapelton 
observes that the increasing ‘public policy reliance’ on a prudential 
response to risk has been paralleled by ‘a general broadening of the 
catchment of situations recognised by the courts as giving rise to tort 
entitlements’ (1995: 820).
It is argued that liability insurance has transformed the very nature 
of tort law. Morton Horwitz, discussing the impact of liability insurance 
on the development of tort law in the United States, observes that:
The individualistic world of Warton’s ‘moral causation’ and ‘free agency’ 
had begun to be transformed into a world of liability insurance in which 
the ‘legislative’ question of who should pay would ultimately undermine 
the self contained, individualistic categories of private law (1982: 211).
Joanne Conaghan and Wade Mansell are of the view that although 
‘individual responsibility continues to be the perspective that informs 
most cases, collective responsibility and loss spreading through the 
mechanism of liability insurance tends to be the incidental by-product’ 
(1993: 11). The social theorist François Ewald, who is noted for his 
genealogical study of insurantial risk in which he characterises risk not 
as a thing but as a form of rationality, also argues that insurance directly 
challenges the juridical practice of assigning responsibility according 
to legal right (1991: 201). However, rather than insurance being the 
passive servant of the law, as Horwitz and Conaghan and Mansell 
seem to assume, Ewald reminds us that the law and insurance each 
provide a means of assigning responsibility and making compensation 
for loss, and that the rationality of each may be applied to the same 
object in pursuit of different ends. He says ‘[i]nsurance and law are 
two practices of responsibility which operate quite heterogeneous 
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categories, regimes, economies; as such, they are mutually exclusive in 
their claims to totality’ (Ewald 1991: 201). The fundamental difference 
between the two is that the juridical focus on the occurrence of an 
event is singular and moral. By contrast, the insurantial approach 
eschews any question of moral responsibility and instead factors the 
probability of such an event occurring and recurring in a predictable 
rule-like fashion (Ewald 1991: 203).
Peter Cane argues that the most significant characteristic of any tort 
action is the correlativity of the parties: ‘Every cause of action in tort 
has elements concerned with the conduct of interacting parties’ (1997: 
13). As a consequence, the real implications of insurance coverage 
generally do not figure in the courtroom because ‘it will always be 
possible to rationalize a rule of tort law in terms of principles of personal 
responsibility … even if it also rationalizes the decision in terms of loss 
spreading’ (1997: 230). Horwitz argues that the correlative character 
of tort litigation described by Cane is to some extent a chimera. He 
says of the usual tort case that ‘[l]iability for injury has become just 
another cost of doing business, which could be estimated, insured 
against, and ultimately included in the price paid by the public’ (1982: 
211). If one is talking about the standard personal injury claim then 
Horwitz’s assessment of the current trajectory of tort litigation is 
accurate. Fleming observes that a defendant’s insurance may very likely 
undermine any deterring or punishing effect that might have followed 
a finding of legal liability (1992: 10). This argument is supported by 
Beck’s analysis of the effects of expert risk calculation: ‘the calculus 
of risks … permits a type of “technological moralization” which no 
longer need employ moral and ethical imperatives directly’ (1999: 51). 
However, we need to allow that ‘technological moralization’ might 
operate alongside, or simultaneously, with traditional notions of moral 
causation. As Ewald reminds us in the case of toxic tort litigation, 
the notion of ‘moral causation’ should not be discarded too readily. 
Such litigation is not resolved by a simple reference to an insurantial 
calculation of risk.
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Under the regime of juridical responsibility … [t]he accident is due to 
some individual fault, imprudence or negligence; it cannot be a rule. 
Moral thought uses accident as a principle of distinction … a unique affair 
between individual protagonists (Ewald 1991: 203).
Insurers may have a capacity through the rule of subrogation to 
dominate the litigation process but they do not litigate as if factors 
beyond their own actuarial calculations are irrelevant. A determination 
of legal liability in toxic tort cases inherently incorporates an assessment 
of the moral culpability of not only the defendant but also the plaintiff. 
That moral culpability is, as I argue further below, bound up with 
assessments of whether the plaintiff was suitably risk-averse. In making 
such assessments the courts weigh up competing accounts of the type 
of risk to which the plaintiff was exposed. These accounts come from 
the parties themselves, experts who provide technical assessments 
of the hazard or harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and  lay 
witnesses such as workmates whose role is to furnish the court with 
a real appreciation of the environment in which the plaintiff was 
exposed to risk.
Scientific risk
Expert scientific evidence relating to causation, and to the risk presented 
by exposure to a particular toxin, toxic event or environment, is an 
integral part of all toxic tort litigation. Inevitably the manner in 
which scientific disciplines such as epidemiology conceive of and 
articulate risk impacts upon legal conceptions of risk. Epidemiology 
is the study of ‘the incidence, distribution and aetiology of disease 
in human populations and applies the findings to alleviate health 
problems’ (Freckelton 2000: 133). The strength of the associations the 
epidemiologist might find between a possible cause and the incidence 
of disease depends upon excluding alternative causes as well as the size 
of the population or cohort studied (Billauer, Moskowitz & Gallinari 
1989: 66). Reliable epidemiological studies are available for only half of 
the known and likely human carcinogens (Cranor & Eastmond 2001: 
10). Nevertheless epidemiological studies have assumed considerable 
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importance in toxic tort litigation not only because they allow the court 
to make some sort of objective assessment on the question of causation 
but also because they provide an identifiable basis for determining the 
limits of the very foreseeability of toxic risk. Epidemiological expertise 
forms part of the evidence which courts use to map a global picture 
of the potential hazards to which a plaintiff may have been exposed. 
It is from this global position that the conduct of both the parties is 
judged. Edward Christie notes that:
A feature of a toxic tort dispute is that a plaintiff can rarely introduce 
particularistic evidence which directly addresses the question of proof of 
causation in the individual plaintiff ’s case … [P]arties must, instead, rely 
on evidence which indicates an increased risk, or increased probability, 
of disease incidence following exposure to a specific chemical (1992: 
303).
Because epidemiological studies develop actuarial calculations of 
risk which are generally not created for legal purposes, there is often 
contest in litigation regarding the value or methodological reliability 
of epidemiological evidence (Billauer, Moskowitz & Gallinari 1989: 
66). Contest over the veracity of expert scientific evidence to some 
extent merely reflects the fact that there is no such thing as scientific 
objectivity or certainty. As Jacqueline Peel observes, ‘[t]he empirical 
basis of science is both a strength and a weakness’ because the potential 
for ‘various types of logical errors’ is inherent in all scientific knowledge 
claims (2005: 35). Science in the courtroom is not the science of the 
research laboratory: it is employed in an adversarial context. The 
testimony of expert scientific witnesses is thus ‘strategically framed’ 
and the courts consider the evidence in that context ( Jasanoff 1995: 
48). Indeed, Australian courts freely acknowledge that:
The pragmatic assessment of probable cause as a basis for tortious liability 
cannot be wholly constrained by the scientific and philosophical purity 
of epidemiology, which essentially depends upon a comparison of the 
data obtained in controlled circumstances (EM Baldwin & Son Pty Ltd v 
Plane; Jsekarb Pty Ltd v Plane).
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Steele notes that the court pragmatically employs an adjudicatory 
model which ‘constructs a moment of decision which may be purely 
hypothetical [knowledge of the risk which exposure to the toxin 
presented at the time of the plaintiff ’s exposure] and uses this to 
draw the “right” conclusion’ on whether the defendant should have 
known of the risk and whether the exposure is likely to have caused 
the injury (2004: 9). It is a dynamic apparent in the leading case of 
Seltsam v McGuiness (hereinafter Seltsam) in which the NSW Court 
of Appeal held that epidemiological studies ‘should be regarded as 
circumstantial evidence which may, alone or in combination with 
other evidence, establish causation in a specific case’ (¶63,566). The 
court recognised epidemiology’s ‘potential utility’ in toxic tort cases 
on the basis that it might ‘fill the gap’ where ‘medical science cannot 
determine the existence or non-existence of a causal relationship 
for purposes of attributing legal responsibility’ (Seltsam: ¶63,566). 
However, despite Chief Justice Spigelman’s thorough examination of 
the utility of epidemiological evidence, he did not identify the point 
at which epidemiological or other forms of scientific evidence should 
be considered compelling (Freckelton 2000: 140), largely because 
that question can only be determined in the context of a wider body 
of non-scientific evidence which combines, in Spigelman’s words, 
with the epidemiological evidence like ‘strands in the cable’ and 
from which causation might be inferred by the court as a matter 
of ‘commonsense’ (Seltsam). But whose common sense? Is a judge’s 
common sense in any way akin to that of the journalist working in 
the ABC’s Brisbane studio, whose common sense tells her that despite 
the lack of a conclusive scientific explanation, coincidence alone does 
not explain why ten women in the one workplace have all developed 
invasive breast cancer (Swan 2007)?
Jasanoff observes that the exercise of the court’s discretion (its 
‘commonsense’) is inevitably shaped by the degree to which ‘ judges are 
swayed by their perceptions of what “science” is and who is a “scientist” 
when they certify an expert’s credibility’ (1995: 59). Debate about the 
proper interpretation of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling 
on the standards that should apply in determining the admissibility 
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of expert scientific evidence in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc (hereinafter Daubert) demonstrates how assessments of risk such 
as those produced by epidemiologists are not neutral elements in the 
legal assessment of risk. The debate regarding the proper interpretation 
of Daubert is about more than simply what type of science should be 
recognised in the court room — it concerns ‘the social and moral 
viability of particular technological choices’ ( Jasanoff 1995: 65–6).
The Supreme Court took the opportunity in Daubert to develop 
criteria which would allow courts to secure ‘relevant and reliable 
evidence’ and overcome the inconsistent jurisprudence that had 
developed in relation to the admissibility of expert evidence (Edmund 
& Mercer 2004: 234).  The court was persuaded by a number of 
influential amicus briefs presented by corporate-sponsored think 
tanks to privilege certain measures of scientific integrity, such as 
Popper’s falsification standard, when determining the validity and 
probative value of scientific evidence(Edmund & Mercer 2004: 244). 
The Daubert decision listed four criteria trial judges should take into 
account in assessing claimed expertise. The court indicated that these 
criteria were intended as a guide only and that the inquiry should be 
flexible. However, as is often the case when a superior court attempts 
to set criteria for future guidance, the Daubert guide soon lost its 
intended flexibility and qualification, and through its very application 
was transformed into a checklist for the application of a fixed rule. 
Edmund and Mercer note that in subsequent decisions Daubert has 
become the basis for imposing a much more stringent admissibility 
threshold (2004: 244, 250). Cranor and Eastmond suggest that courts 
have ‘misunderstood or learned the wrong lessons’ from Daubert and 
several other Bendectin cases, and that the courts now expect other 
cases involving different toxins which have been subject to far less 
scientific scrutiny than Bendectin to be able to meet impossibly high 
evidentiary standards (2001: 9). As a consequence they argue, Daubert 
reforms have locked out plaintiffs who have based their claim on 
‘reliable, but not ideal, scientific evidence’ (2001: 6). Edmunds and 
Mercer cite the fate of Newman v Motorola Inc (hereinafter Newman) 
in support of the argument that:
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Daubert-inspired quests to establish scientific truth … may assist in 
discouraging ongoing legal scrutiny of intransigent scientific controversies 
involving uncertain risks (2004: 243).
Newman was one of the first cases relating to the hazards of mobile 
(cell) phone use. Its failure has been significant for a large cluster of 
potential toxic tort claims relating to the harm caused by mobile 
phones (Edmunds & Mercer 2004: 239–40, Capriotti 2002). Blake J, 
in a decision that was affirmed on appeal, rejected the evidence of the 
plaintiff ’s expert epidemiological and oncological witness, Professor 
Lennart Hardell. She did so by what Edmund and Mercer argue was 
a ‘strategic manipulation of the Daubert criteria’ (2004: 240). While 
Hardell’s research and opinion were not mainstream, the relevant ‘real 
world’ science on the biological effects of electromagnetic radiation 
and mobile phone use is hardly settled. Public concern about the risk 
it presents, coupled with the want of scientific certainty about the risk, 
has been serious enough to have generated independent inquiries in 
several Western countries (Capriotti 2002: 2–3, Peel 2005: 108–9). 
There simply has not been the passage of time and sufficient scientific 
research to produce large-cohort epidemiological studies of the effects 
of electromagnetic radiation generated by cell phones (Capriotti 2002: 
4). Cranor and Eastmond note that even when a potential toxic hazard 
comes to scientific attention it takes considerable time and resources to 
accumulate a body of reliable scientific evidence evaluating its effect 
on humans and the environment, and ‘it takes longer still to establish 
a scientific consensus’ (2001: 13). In the case of Newman, Hardell’s 
testimony was rejected on the basis that the judge disapproved of his 
methodological approach (Newman: 14). Edmunds and Mercer argue 
that her reasoning and approach to the admissibility of Hardell’s 
evidence demonstrate how ‘ideal images of the scientific method can 
be used in legal settings to help deconstruct or marginalize particular 
forms of expertise’ and, in so doing, ‘restrict the entry of (novel) 
scientific claims’ (2004: 241–2). The ‘commonsense’ approach of the 
Australian cases to causation currently favours a broader, less idealised 
approach to expert scientific evidence which recognises that scientific 
evidence is unlikely to be able to fully determine questions of legal 
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causation. However, what counts as ‘commonsense’ can shift and the 
Daubert legacy in the US is instructive on this point.
When a court places greater emphasis on scientific evidence of the 
causal nexus the plaintiff ’s lived experience of the hazard assumes less 
importance in the proceedings. The trajectory of the Daubert ruling, 
for instance, has been to shift the court’s attention away from a holistic 
focus in which the ‘scientific evidence supports a claim framed in lay 
terms’ towards what Karen Morrow has labelled, in her analysis of 
British and Irish nuisance cases, a ‘harder’ approach to causation in 
which the evidence of the plaintiff is marginalised in favour of scientific 
evidence (Morrow 2000: 144–9 n32). In the nuisance case of Graham 
and Graham v Re-Chem (hereinafter Graham) Morrow notes the court 
was not satisfied that the plaintiffs’ evidence established a causal nexus 
between the damage suffered by the plaintiffs and the emissions from 
the defendant’s incinerator. Their evidence was judged ‘very confused 
and confusing, contradictory and riddled with inconsistencies’ (quoted 
in Morrow 2000: 148). The fact that there had been findings by official 
inquiries regarding the hazards of the defendant’s incinerator was also 
considered to be of little consequence, even when coupled with the 
plaintiff ’s testimony. This was because the reports documenting that 
risk were in general terms and did not evidence that activities of the 
defendant specifically caused the plaintiff ’s damage. In essence, the 
plaintiff ’s case failed in the court’s view because the plaintiffs had not 
provided ‘detailed clinical, pathological and histological evidence of 
… toxic insult’; their case was not buttressed by sufficiently persuasive 
and detailed scientific evidence (quoted in Morrow 2000: 148).
It is possible to find cases which evidence both a ‘hard’ and a ‘soft’ 
approach to causation as Morrow has done. A court has immense 
power to characterise a plaintiff ’s evidence, simply through language, 
as either more or less authentic than the scientific evidence. In making 
this point Morrow turns to the case of Hanrahan v Merck, Sharp & 
Dohme (Ireland) Ltd, which stands in sharp contrast to Graham’s case. 
On appeal in Hanrahan Henchy J found that the defendant’s expert 
scientific evidence, based on readings of emissions from the plant 
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and computer models, did not pay due attention to the ‘real physical 
context of the emissions’ as evidenced by the plaintiff ’s witnesses. He 
held that ‘[t]heoretical or inductive evidence cannot be allowed to 
displace proven facts … [This] would be to allow scientific theory to 
dethrone fact’ (quoted in Morrow 2000: 146).
The degree to which a court aligns ‘legal causation with scientific 
causation’ not only determines what type of science will count in the 
litigation, it will also impact upon the significance and weight attached 
to other forms of non-scientific evidence (Edmonds & Mercer 2002: 
103). The discussion now turns to examine the relevance of other 
non-scientific, and quite subjective, calculations of risk.
Risk and common sense
In our ‘lived life’ we tend to understand risk in terms of its common or 
everyday meaning rather than as an actuarial calculation or an object 
of scientific analysis. In its common, everyday sense, risk is a term 
used to describe danger or hazard (Ewald 1991). Risks of this kind are 
not statistical calculations, they are social or cultural constructs. Such 
ideas of risk often have some genesis in a scientific prediction of risk, 
but they have developed to encompass an array of popular knowledge, 
beliefs and practices that are not limited by the confines of scientific 
discourse (Douglas 1992: 24). Research by cognitive psychologists 
has demonstrated that
‘lay’ people evaluate health and environmental threats according to a 
different set of criteria than may be reflected in expert assessments. … 
[T]he risk perception of lay members of the community appears to be 
influenced by various contextual factors that lie outside the realm of 
scientific research (Peel 2005: 68).
These factors include familiarity with a technology, the degree 
of control which can be asserted over it and the potential for the 
application of the technology to have catastrophic effects (Peel 2005: 
68). Jasanoff observes that
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people will tolerate a higher probability of death and injury from activities 
that they feel they can meaningfully control (smoking, eating, automobile 
driving) then from activities that heighten their sense of powerlessness or 
distrust (nuclear power, pesticide use, air transportation) (1995: 13).
Robert Lee argues that ‘the public experience of risk is not one of 
unthinking acceptance of a position expounded by experts, nor is it a 
simple choice between expert positions’ (2000: 86). Notwithstanding 
the trend in some post Daubert litigation in the United States, risk is 
not calculated solely according to expert scientific evidence by courts 
in toxic tort litigation either. In Chappel v Hart the Australian High 
Court observed causation is ‘a question of fact resolved as matter 
of commonsense and experience[;] the conclusion is often reached 
intuitively’ (Chappel v Hart: 562).
A plaintiff ’s subjective appreciation of their toxic exposure and its 
consequences is as vital as evidence of the defendant’s conduct to the 
court’s determination of legal liability. This dynamic is readily apparent 
in Seaman J’s decision in Napolitano v CSR Ltd (hereinafter Napolitano). 
The plaintiff in that case, Mr Napolitano, had worked for two years 
for the defendant in its blue asbestos mine in Wittenoom. He sued the 
defendant in tort not only because he had developed mesothelioma (a 
fatal asbestos-related disease) but also because over a period of years 
he had developed a psychiatric illness which he attributed to his long-
standing fear that he would succumb to mesothelioma. The defendants 
admitted liability for the plaintiff ’s mesothelioma but denied liability for 
his psychiatric illness. The court regarded the ‘question of liability for 
psychiatric injury to be a matter of major complexity’ (Napolitano: 6). 
Nevertheless the judgment is characterised by a pragmatic and candid 
take on the evidence rather than the usual careful rationalisation and 
artifice that attaches to judicial decision-making. Seaman J’s decision has 
been criticised for its ‘lack of analysis of principle or authority’ (Mullany 
1997: 137). But for the purposes of this discussion it is perhaps all the 
more instructive for that omission, as it means the clinical gaze of the 
court on the particulars of the plaintiff ’s experience of living with the 
risk of such massive past exposure to asbestos is all the more apparent.
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It was necessary for the court to establish on the balance of 
probabilities that the plaintiff ’s ‘illness of mind’ was caused by the 
defendants’ conduct — that causal nexus was ‘determined by applying 
common-sense to the facts’ of the case (Napolitano: 20). Seaman J 
cursorily distinguished Mr Napolitano’s situation from other nervous 
shock cases and then refocused on the particulars of the plaintiff ’s 
case, observing that:
It seems to me the controlling features of liability for psychiatric illness 
cannot be determined in the abstract and this case cannot turn on statements 
of policy apt to very different factual situations (Napolitano: 22).
Anxiety or fear of contracting a disease is not, on its own, a 
basis for any form of compensation beyond payment for medical 
monitoring of the plaintiff ’s health. Seaman J did not break from 
that legal requirement. Mr Napolitano’s condition was a recognisable 
mental illness, but analysis of the judgement suggests that it was the 
particulars of Mr Napolitano’s experience and fear, made palpable by 
the psychiatric diagnosis and ultimately vindicated by the fact that Mr 
Napolitano was to die of the very disease he feared, that primarily 
motivated the judge’s decision. Seaman J’s conclusion was that Mr 
Napolitano had suffered ‘a very long period of misery and anxiety 
and fear’ (Napolitano: 25) and that his
depressive illness was induced by the perception of the plaintiff of the 
distressing phenomena of asbestos-induced illness in his fellow Wittenoom 
workers who were his friends and in particular Mr Cinquina [his best 
friend] (Napolitano: 20–1).
Mullany suggests that ‘[o]ne gleans the impression from his 
judgement that Seaman J simply formed the opinion that it was just 
in the particular circumstances to compensate the plaintiff ’ (1997: 
137). This notion of what is ‘ just’ leads us to the next point of this 
discussion, which is that legal liability in toxic tort actions is very 
much determined in the context of a moral evaluation of the parties’ 
conduct and of their attitude and response to risk.
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Together with an expectation that the individual will monitor him- 
or herself and be risk-averse, risk in its commonly understood sense has, 
according to the social anthropologist Mary Douglas (1992), become 
inextricably linked with blame. Whereas the technical calculations 
of epidemiological risk are treated as objective everyday notions of 
risk are a basis for ascribing moral culpability. In the courtroom toxic 
tort litigation, despite its consideration of detailed scientific evidence, 
appears to turn as much upon moral assessment of the parties’ conduct as 
on scientific argument and testimony or points of law. Indeed, Robert 
Rabin describes tobacco litigation in the United States as ‘a last vestige 
of a vision of nineteenth century tort law as an interpersonal morality 
play’ (1993: 122). The clinical risk approach (discussed below) that 
conceptualises risk in terms of the impact on specific individuals is 
taken up here in part because it facilitates analysis of how the moral 
conduct of the parties is framed and assessed in toxic tort litigation.
Clinical risk assessment
The main consideration of much risk commentary in the social 
sciences is how risk is produced by collective anxiety and politics (Beck 
1992, Douglas 1992), or as a function of certain forms of scientific or 
actuarial calculations (for a survey of this commentary see Lupton 1999, 
O’Malley 2004). When legal commentators consider the function of 
risk assessment in litigation, their focus also tends to be on actuarial 
or other scientific calculations of risk. It is a literature that is rarely 
interested in how the individual actually engages or copes with, or is 
otherwise affected by, risk. The clinical approach to thinking about 
risk which is prevalent in public health programs is taken up in this 
argument because its focus is on the relationship between expert 
assessments of risk and the individual as an individual (not simply as a 
member of a risk-prone population). Clinical risk approaches, informed 
by risk expertise, develop programs which aim to reduce the exposure 
of members of these groups, rather than whole populations, to risk 
(O’Malley 2004: 22, Weir 1996).
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Public health programs — such as those aimed at pregnant 
women, drug-users or smokers — use clinical risk techniques such 
as diagnoses and therapeutics. The clinician, working on the basis 
of ‘probabilistic indicators of future conditions’ or ‘risk’ to a certain 
type of patient’s health, develops a program of intervention aimed at 
minimising these risks (O’Malley 2004: 22). For example, in light 
of known risk factors gleaned from epidemiological studies and past 
clinical experience, pregnant women have become subject to an 
increasing array of interventions aimed at protecting the health of 
the unborn foetus. Regular ultrasounds and blood tests are scheduled 
for the pregnant woman/patient; she will be advised what foods she 
should eat and which she should avoid; she is told to abstain from 
alcohol, quit smoking and even, when it might be appropriate, to 
consider terminating a pregnancy (O’Malley 2004: 7–8, Weir 1996). 
The clinical governance of pregnancy allows an expectant mother 
to ‘identify generic pregnancy anxieties’ with her own ‘particular 
characteristics and behaviour’ (O’Malley 2004: 8). These types of 
clinical interventions are not simply imposed on a passive patient; 
being pregnant is shaped and framed by a wider public discourse 
and common knowledge of how one should manage pregnancy — a 
knowledge that was not available to previous generations of pregnant 
women. O’Malley, taking up Lorna Weir’s (1996) analysis, argues that 
the experience and responsibility of being pregnant have changed such 
that a rational expectant mother will now not only accept but positively 
embrace and seek out the clinician’s advice (O’Malley 2004: 8).
Toxic tort litigation is not therapeutic, beyond the fact that 
successful litigation and/or the threat of further litigation forces some 
defendants who are found liable to reform their practices so that the 
hazard of exposure is limited or eradicated. However, it is argued 
here that the focus of clinical risk techniques on the individual’s 
exposure to risk is a useful way of thinking about how the figure of 
the plaintiff (like the patient) is constructed within the domain of toxic 
tort litigation. This focus on the formation of the plaintiff is necessary 
to this discussion because, despite the broader risk discourse within 
which any toxic tort litigation takes place, the individual litigating 
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parties remain the primary focus of the court (Cane 1997: 13). Jasanoff 
observes that in this type of litigation the courts tend to
favour a holistic (or medical) to a reductionist, or toxicological model 
of illness. The holistic view focuses on the suffering individual and asks 
whether, given the totality of circumstances, this person could have been 
affected in the stated way by the stated exposure … this approach presumes 
that issues of general or specific causation must be addressed together, 
within the context of the plaintiff’s lived life (1995: 125 emphasis added).
Whether or not the plaintiff, as much as the defendant, adopted 
appropriate risk-averse behaviour in the face of risk is implicated in the 
court’s assessment of the plaintiff ’s case. The dynamic which I suggest 
operates is identified in sociological terms by Deborah Lupton:
The modern concept of risk, like that of taboo, has a ‘forensic’ property, 
for it works backwards in explaining ill-fortune, as well as forwards in 
predicting future retribution. Thus the experience of a heart attack, a 
positive HIV test result, or the discovery of a cancerous lesion are evidence 
that the ill person has failed to comply with directives to reduce health risks 
and therefore is to be blamed for his or her predicament (1993: 430).
The clinical risk approach highlights the manner by which the 
toxic tort litigation constructs a certain type of legal subject. The 
success of the plaintiff ’s case will in part be determined by whether 
they are able to situate themselves as risk-averse or irresponsible in 
the face of known risk (Morrow 2000, Rabin 1993, Toffolon-Weiss 
& Roberts 2004).
Risk, blame, responsibility and liability
As Ewald (1991) observes, how we construct and understand risks 
determines our response to them. For example, a materially founded 
apprehension of risk (such as the fact that past heavy exposure to 
asbestos may cause mesothelioma some time in the future, or findings 
of abnormally high lead levels in a pre-school child) is apt to produce 
anxiety, especially if there is no technical capacity to control the 
risk (Beck 1992, Douglas 1992, Lee 2000). By contrast, if risks are 
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understood as probabilities they are seemingly amenable to control in 
a number of forms (although that control may not be so much real as 
contrived). It may be control exercised at a distance through insurance, 
or it might be control exercised at the level of the individual, as in 
a clinical setting where the clinician situates the individual and her 
lifestyle or patterns of consumption against a background of known 
risk (O’Malley 2004).
The knowability of risk, underpinned by the scientific capacity to 
identify hazardous activities and substances, imposes responsibility not 
only on hazard creators but also on their potential victims. It produces 
a moral imperative to actively take up risk-averse behaviour, such as 
giving up smoking or employing work-safe practices (O’Malley 2004). 
Lupton argues that, in a sociological sense, risk in modern society has 
come to replace the old-fashioned (and, in modern secular society, now 
largely discredited) notion of sin as a term that ‘runs across the gamut 
of social life to moralise and politicise dangers’ (1993: 428).
For the tort plaintiff who has been the victim of exposure to a lethal 
toxic substance in circumstances where others had responsibility for 
their well-being, the opportunity for a ‘day in court’ is an opportunity 
for the moral rightness of their claim to be recognised. While it is not 
being argued that a court deciding a toxic tort case necessarily frames 
its decision solely in terms of moral culpability of the parties, blame and 
responsibility are nevertheless central to the discourse within which 
the case is argued and considered. Cane observes that:
Tort law is concerned with people’s responsibility for their acts and 
omissions. And because it deals with interactions between people, it 
contains principles relevant not only to the conduct of injurers but also 
to the conduct of victims (1997: 13).
The allocation of blame and the finding of liability are influenced 
by subjective assessments of the moral character and reputation of the 
litigants. The fact that expert calculations of risk tend to produce an 
amoralisation of the dispute does not necessarily preclude non-expert 
understandings of risk becoming the basis for ascribing blame.
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Asbestos and tobacco litigation: 
The credibility of the plaintiff
Liability in toxic tort cannot be assessed outside the context of the broader 
cultural values about risk-taking. On this point the relative success of 
tobacco and asbestos litigation is instructive. Public concern about and 
knowledge of the risks associated with both asbestos and tobacco is 
sophisticated and widespread. The hazards of exposure to tobacco and 
asbestos are readily identifiable and scientific evidence of the injuries that 
can be caused by exposure to each toxin is well documented (Kune & 
Kune 2003). Because the practical scientific limitations of establishing 
an association between exposure to either of these toxins and harm is not 
as significant as it has proved to be in other types of toxic tort claims, it 
is not surprising that tobacco and asbestos litigation have become two 
notable categories of toxic tort (Rabin 2001: 352–3).
In contrast to plaintiffs whose injuries are the result of asbestos 
exposure, plaintiffs claiming compensation for smoking-related injuries 
have generally not had the same degree of success. The difference 
between the relative success of the asbestos and tobacco toxic tort 
litigation does not lay in the scientific evidence, as there is a wealth 
of evidence available regarding the toxic nature of exposure to both 
asbestos and tobacco. The factor which marks the difference between 
the two types of tort is the circumstances in which each type of toxic 
exposure typically occurs. It is not only the court’s view of what 
is required by the law to establish causation which finds a plaintiff 
with asbestos-related lung cancer in a better position than a plaintiff 
with smoking-induced lung cancer. It is also the clinical focus of the 
litigation on ‘particulars’, on the individual’s attitude to risk and the 
care and responsibility the individual has taken for him- or herself.
In his account of the fate of tobacco litigation in the United States, 
Rabin (1993) has observed that there are two different types of plaintiffs 
in toxic tort litigation: those who are characterised as victims and 
those who are seen as irresponsible. Deep-pocket tobacco company 
defendants have relied with some success on arguments that smoker-
plaintiffs have not acted responsibly in failing to heed health warnings 
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printed on tobacco product packaging and advertising (Capriotti 2002: 
7, Kearns 1999). In an observation highlighting the significance of 
the court’s clinical focus on the plaintiff ’s conduct in the face of toxic 
exposure, Rabin argues that the plaintiff faces considerable difficulty in 
managing the expert evidence relating to the health effects or addictive 
nature of smoking, despite the fact that in a strictly evidential sense it 
supports the plaintiff ’s case.
[T]he addiction expert’s translation of scientific data on reinforcement, 
withdrawal, reactive effects, and other esoteric phenomena into terms 
that make sense to the jury remains a rather abstract undertaking. The 
expert is in no position to say anything about the individual smoker … 
By contrast, the defense on the addiction issue is grounded in particulars: 
the claimant could have quit, knew the risks, evinced a life-long taste for 
dangerous activities, and so forth (1993: 124).
To succeed, the tobacco plaintiff has to be able to argue a case that 
moves beyond the blame that everyday conceptions of risk attach to 
their failure to be risk-averse. By contrast, the plaintiff who has been 
exposed to asbestos was usually not in a position to voluntarily limit 
his or her exposure. The moral claim of the asbestos-diseased plaintiff 
is illuminated by the fact that the world’s major asbestos producers 
knew of the dangers of asbestos exposure and conspired to keep it a 
secret (Rabin 2001: 353). Since the revelation of the ‘Cigarette Papers’ 
plaintiffs in tobacco litigation are now able to take up a similar strategy, 
particularly those who commenced smoking in their childhood before 
the dangers of cigarette-smoking were widely known in the public 
domain, or those who switched to low-tar cigarettes in the mistaken 
belief that they presented less risk to health (Rabin 2001).
This focus on the credibility of the plaintiff operates in other toxic 
tort litigation as well. In their study of several tort actions relating 
to the toxic contamination of land and urban housing in Louisiana, 
Melissa Toffolon-Weis and Timmons Roberts observe that many of 
the plaintiffs in those cases were poor and had limited access to quality 
health care. As a result they had only a limited appreciation of the 
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factors that posed a risk to health. The credibility of their claims was 
readily undermined because the plaintiffs
may have been exposed to dangerous work and lifestyle factors that are 
often presented by the defense as alternative causative factors. Government 
and corporate officials do not take the symptoms of these people seriously. 
They attribute the poor health of these communities to unhealthy lifestyles 
(eg. eating fatty foods, smoking, drinking alcohol and taking drugs) …. 
Further, middle class jurors’ own prejudices may affect their judgments 
when viewing poorer individuals with different life experiences (Toffolon-
Weis & Roberts 2004: 261).
Morrow’s analysis of the nuisance cases in Ireland and England 
also shows that a defendant can prevent the success of a plaintiff ’s 
claim, even in the face of what seems to be strong scientific evidence 
of causation, by discrediting the plaintiff ’s lifestyle and conduct. Just as 
a worker with lung cancer following asbestos exposure has to counter 
claims that his past tobacco use may in part be responsible for his 
injuries, Morrow found that farmers who complained that their health, 
and that of their livestock, were effected by toxic emissions had to 
counter claims that their illness was attributable not to the defendant 
but rather to their own unhealthy lifestyle and poor farming practices 
(Morrow 2000: 149). In some cases the causal link between the toxic 
emissions and the damage suffered may well have been tenuous, but 
the point is that the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed unless she or he can 
demonstrate that they have been risk-aware and risk-averse.
The very fact that toxic tort actions are necessarily premised on 
what Cane (1997) labels the ‘correlativity’ of the parties may make 
them an uncertain prospect if a plaintiff is not able to convincingly 
argue their moral claim to compensation. Lee, developing Cane’s 
analysis, contends that liability in tort is determined in the context of 
certain assumptions about socially appropriate conduct; tort law is a 
means of enforcing ‘social rules’ (2000: 78). The function of ‘social 
rules’ and the moral dynamic of an assessment of risk and liability is 
evident in the case of Christopher Haar v Uneedus Scaffolding Pty Ltd 
(hereinafter Haar), in which the responsibility of both the defendant 
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employer and the plaintiff employee were assessed in the context of the 
broader cultural values about risk taking. Mr Haar had been exposed 
to asbestos in the late 1970s in his employment as a rigger. He worked 
alongside other workers employed by a different contractor to remove 
asbestos from the building around which Harr was erecting scaffolds. 
In breach of a range of health and safety regulations, Haar’s defendant 
employer neither provided any special clothing to protect Haar against 
asbestos nor require him to wear any, even though the asbestos-removal 
workers wore special masks and suits. What might seem a clear-cut case 
against the defendant was muddied by the defendant’s counterclaim 
that Harr’s smoking was implicated in the development of his cancer. 
The defendant claimed that because Harr was aware at the time of the 
hazards of smoking he was contributorily negligent. The jury reduced 
the damages award by twenty percent for contributory negligence but 
the presiding judge declined to accept the jury’s finding. O’Bryan J 
held that even though at the time of Haar’s exposure health warnings 
were printed on cigarette and tobacco packaging, and even though 
Haar had not denied that he had been aware that there was some 
scientific evidence that smoking could cause cancer, he had not acted 
negligently. The law of contributory negligence required the court to 
consider Haar’s conduct in light of ‘the circumstances and conditions in 
which he had to do his work’ (Podreresek v Australian Iron and Steel Pty 
Ltd). Those conditions, it was held, included the fact that most manual 
workers smoked. Site agreements at the time even allowed workers 
designated ‘smoko’ breaks. O’Bryan J held that, despite the increased 
public awareness of the hazards of tobacco consumption, smoking was 
a routine, normal, accepted practice of workers in Haar’s circumstances 
at the time, so this did not make him culpable for his injury.
Concluding comments
The case of the women who developed breast cancer while working at 
the ABC Brisbane news studio and offices highlights the difficulty of 
identifying the toxic hazards of post-industrial society, while the case 
of the people who were exposed to lead in Esperance is evidence of the 
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unpredictable nature of exposure to toxic hazards. Each of these incidents 
of toxic exposure has prompted the respective state governments to 
conduct inquiries into the circumstances surrounding the exposure 
and has been the subject of extended media report. These people have 
encountered the type of lurking toxic hazard that commentators such 
as Beck (1992) and Douglas (1992) argue we have come to dread. Toxic 
tort litigation is a response to this sort of exposure. It provides a means 
for claiming compensation not provided by other investigative initiatives 
such as a government inquiry. But perhaps as significantly, toxic tort 
litigation reveals and reports the existence of environmental hazards in 
a manner which focuses on the impact of the toxin on them personally, 
and publicly delineates the harm they have suffered. Unlike a public 
inquiry, which inevitably produces a generalised account of the toxic 
exposure, toxic tort litigation allows the articulation of the real, rather 
than simply theorised or projected, experience and consequence of toxic 
exposure (Kroll-Smith & Westervelt 2004).
But suing in toxic tort is not straightforward. The ubiquitous 
and unpredictable nature of exposure to toxic hazards means that 
establishing foreseeability of the risk and causation are more, rather than 
less, typical of any potential toxic tort claim. The focus of discussion 
here has not been so much on assessing whether these particular cases 
would succeed if a toxic tort claim was made, but rather on considering 
the interface of the different types of evidence a court hearing a toxic 
tort case is likely to consider. Four interrelated concepts of ‘risk’ have 
been employed as a device for comparing the various ways in which a 
plaintiff ’s claim is conceptualised and assessed in toxic tort litigation. 
These conjunctions of risk include insurantial, scientific, common sense 
and clinical notions producing a heterogeneous and multi-dimensional 
understanding of how a court assesses a toxic tort claim. While the 
central focus of the litigation is the plaintiff ’s situated and particular 
experience of the toxic exposure, their claim is also assessed in light of 
more theoretical and generalised constructions of toxic risk, as well as 
commonly held attitudes to managing the risk of toxic exposure that 
assume the plaintiff, and not just the defendant, is an informed and 
‘rational’ individual, both risk-aware and risk-averse.
98
Goodie
References
ABC News Online 27 March 2007 ‘Forum hears of “high” Esperance lead 
levels’ <www. abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200703/s1882285.htm> 
accessed 6 June 2007
— 12 June 2007 ‘Lead contamination hearing extended’ <www. abc.net.au/
news/newsitems/200706/s1948542.htm> accessed 25 June 2007
Armstrong B 2006 ‘Breast Cancer at the ABC Toowong Queensland: Third 
Progress Report of the Independent Review and Scientific Investigation 
Panel – 21 December 2006’
Beck U 1992 Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity Sage London
— 1999 World Risk Society Polity Press Cambridge
Billauer B, Moskowitz A and Gallinari K 1989 ‘The Toxic Tort is Ill: 
Deficiencies in the Plaintiff ’s Case and How to Prove Them’ in Schnare 
D and Katzman M eds 1989: 65–84
Burchell G, Gordon C and Miller P eds 1991 The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality Harvester/Wheatsheaf London
Cane P 1997 The Anatomy of Tort Hart Publishing Oxford
Capriotti S 2002 ‘Is There a Future For Cell Phone Litigation?’ Journal of 
Contemporary Health Law and Policy 18: 489–510
Christie E 1992 ‘Toxic Tort Disputes: Proof of Causation and the Courts’ 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 9/5: 302–18
Colbran S, Reinhardt G, Spender P, Jackson S and Douglas R 2002 Civil 
Procedure: Commentary and Materials LexisNexis Butterworths Chatswood 
(2nd edn)
Conaghan J and Mansell W 1993 The Wrongs of Tort Pluto Press London
Cotterrell R 1986 ‘Law and Sociology: Notes on the Constitution and 
Confrontations of Disciplines’ Journal of Law and Society 13/1: 9–34
Cranor C and Eastmond D 2001 ‘Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Patterns of 
Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need for Liability Reform’ 
Law and Contemporary Problems 64/4: 5–48
Darier E ed 1999 Discourses of the Environment Blackwell Publishers Oxford
Dean M 1999 Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society Sage London
Douglas M 1992 Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory Routledge 
London
99
Toxic Tort
Douglas M and Wildasky A 1982 Risk and Culture Basil Blackwell Oxford
Edmond G and Mercer D 2002 ‘Rebels Without a Cause?: Judges, Medical 
and Scientific Evidence and the Uses of Causation’ in Freckelton I and 
Mendelson D eds 2002: 83–124
— 2004 ‘Daubert and the Exclusionary Ethos: The Convergence of Corporate 
and Judicial Attitudes towards the Admissibility of Expert Evidence in 
Tort’ Litigation. Law and Policy 26/2: 231–56
Ewald F 1991 ‘Insurance and Risk’ in Burchell G, Gordon C and Miller P 
eds 1991: 197–210
Fleming J 1992 The Law of Torts Law Book Company North Ryde (9th edn)
Freckelton I 2000 ‘Epidemiology Evidence’ (editorial) Journal of Law and 
Medicine 8: 133–41
Freckelton I and Mendelson D eds 2002 Causation and Law in Medicine Ashgate 
Dartmouth Aldershot
Goodie J 2001 ‘The Invention of the Environment as a Subject of Legal 
Governance’ in Pavlich G and Wickham G eds 2001: 79–91
Havemann P 2003 ‘Genetic Modification, Ecological Good Governance and 
the Law: New Zealand in the Age of Risk’ James Cook University Law 
Review 10: 7–50
Horwitz M 1982 ‘The Doctrine of Objective Causation’ in Kairys D ed 1982: 
201–13
Huber P 1991 Galileo’s Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom Basic Books 
New York
Jasanoff S 1995 Science at the Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America Harvard 
University Press Cambridge Mass
Kairys D ed 1982 The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique Pantheon New 
York
Kearns S 1999 ‘Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions’ New York 
University Law Review 74: 1336–75
Kroll-Smith S and Westervelt S 2004 ‘People, Bodies and Biospheres: Nexus 
and the Toxic Tort’ Law and Policy 26/2: 177–86
Kune R and Kune G 2003 ‘Proof of cancer causation and expert evidence: 
Bringing science to the law and the law to science’ Journal of Law and 
Medicine 11: 112–21
100
Goodie
Lanthier I and Olivier L 1999 ‘The Construction of Environmental 
“Awareness”’ Trans M Eloy in Darier E ed 1999: 63–78
Law Commission of Canada ed 2005 Law and Risk UBC Press Vancouver
Lee R 2000 ‘From the Individual to the Environmental: Tort Law in 
Turbulence’ in Lowry J and Edmunds R eds 2000: 77–91
Lowry J and Edmunds R eds 2000 Environmental Protection and the Common 
Law Hart Publishing Oxford
Lupton D 1993 ‘Risk as Moral Danger: The Social and Political Functions 
of Risk Disclosure in Public Health’ The International Journal of Health 
Sciences 23/3: 425–35
— 1999 Risk Routledge London
Morrow K 2000 ‘Nuisance and Environmental Protection’ Lowry J and 
Edmunds R eds 2000: 139–59
Mullany N ed 1997 Torts in the Nineties LBC Information Services North 
Ryde
— 1997 ‘Fear for the Future: Liability for Infliction of Psychiatric Damage’ 
in Mullany N ed 1997: 101–73
O’Malley P 2004 Risk, Uncertainty and Government The Glasshouse Press 
London
Pavlich G and Wickham G eds 2001 Rethinking Law, Society and Governance: 
Foucault’s Bequest Hart Publishing Oxford
Peel J 2005 The Precautionary Principle in Practice: Environmental Decision-making 
and Scientific Uncertainty The Federation Press Sydney
Rabin R 1993 ‘Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort 
Liability’ in Rabin R and Sugarman S eds 1993: 111–30
— 2001 ‘The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment’ DePaul Law Review 
51: 331–58
Rabin R and Sugarman S eds 1993 Smoking Policy: Law, Politics and Culture 
Harper Torchbooks New York
Schnare D and Katzman M eds 1989 Chemical Contamination and its Victims: 
Medical Remedies, Legal Redress, and Public Policy Quorum Books New 
York
Stapelton J 1995 ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’ Modern Law Review 58: 
820–45
Steele J 2004 Risks and Legal Theory Hart Publishing Oxford
101
Toxic Tort
Sugarman S 2002 ‘Mixed Results from United States Tobacco Litigation’ Torts 
Law Review, 10(2): 94–126.
Swan N 2007 The Health Report: The inside story – breast cancer at the ABC’s 
Brisbane offices ABC Radio National 5 February <www.abc.net.au/rn/
healthreport/stories/2007/1838331.htm accessed> 26 February 2007
Toffolon-Weiss M and Timmons Roberts J 2004 ‘Toxic Torts, Public Interest 
Law, and Environmental Justice: Evidence from Louisiana’ Law and Policy 
26/2: 259–87
The West Australian 2007 ‘Compo call over port lead scandal’ 5 May: 8
Valverde M, Levi R and Moore D 2005 ‘Legal Knowledges of Risk’ in Law 
Commission of Canada ed 2005: 86–120
Weir L 1996 ‘Recent Developments in the Governance of Pregnancy’ Economy 
and Society 25/3: 372
Cases
EM Baldwin & Son Pty Ltd v Plane; Jsekarb Pty Ltd v Plane (1999) Aust Tort 
Reports ¶81–499
Chappel v Hart (1998) 156 ALR 517
Christopher Haar v Uneedus Scaffolding Pty Ltd (1989) Supreme Court of Victoria 
No. 4918 of 1989
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 509 US 579, 113 SCt 2786, 125 
LEd2d 469 (1993)
Graham and Graham v Re-Chem [1996] Env. LR 158
Hanrahan v Merck, Sharp & Dohme (Ireland) Ltd [1988] ILRM 629
Maddalena v CSR Ltd & Anor [2004] WASCA 231
Napolitano v CSR Ltd & Anor (1994) unreported; SCt of WA (Seaman J); 
Library NO 94087; 30 August 1994
Newman v Motorola Inc 218 F Supp 2d 769 (D Md 2002)
Newman v Motorola Inc No. 02-2424 Court of Appeals (4th Cir 2003)
Podreresek v Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 529
Seltsam Pty Ltd and Anor. v McGuiness (2000) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-547
Verb v Motorola Inc 672 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40
